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Abstract
We consider the problem of multi-message private information retrieval (MPIR)
from N non-communicating replicated databases. In MPIR, the user is interested
in retrieving P messages out of M stored messages without leaking the identity of
the retrieved messages. The information-theoretic sum capacity of MPIR CPs is the
maximum number of desired message symbols that can be retrieved privately per down-
loaded symbol. For the case P ≥ M2 , we determine the exact sum capacity of MPIR
as CPs =
1
1+M−P
PN
. The achievable scheme in this case is based on downloading MDS-
coded mixtures of all messages. For P ≤ M2 , we develop lower and upper bounds for all
M,P,N . These bounds match if the total number of messages M is an integer multiple
of the number of desired messages P , i.e., MP ∈ N. In this case, CPs =
1− 1
N
1−( 1
N
)M/P
. The
achievable scheme in this case generalizes the single-message capacity achieving scheme
to have unbalanced number of stages per round of download. For all the remaining
cases, the difference between the lower and upper bound is at most 0.0082, which oc-
curs for M = 5, P = 2, N = 2. Our results indicate that joint retrieval of desired
messages is more efficient than successive use of single-message retrieval schemes.
1 Introduction
The privacy of the contents of the downloaded information from curious public databases has
attracted considerable research within the computer science community [1–4]. The problem
is motivated by practical examples such as: ensuring privacy of investors as they download
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CNS 13-14733, CCF 14-22111, CCF 14-22129, and CNS 15-
26608. A shorter version is submitted to IEEE ISIT 2017.
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records in a stock market, since revealing the interest in a certain record may influence its
value; ensuring the privacy of an inventor as they look up existing patents in a database,
since revealing what they are looking at leaks some information about the current invention
they are working on; and protecting activists in oppressive regimes as they browse restricted
content on the internet [2]. In the classical private information retrieval (PIR) problem, a
user wishes to download a certain message (or file) from N non-communicating databases
without leaking any information about the identity of the downloaded message. The contents
of the databases are identical. The user performs this operation by preparing and submitting
queries to all databases. The databases respond truthfully with answer strings which are
functions of the queries and the messages. The user needs to reconstruct the desired message
from these answer strings. A trivial solution for this seemingly difficult problem is for the
user to download the contents of all databases. This solution however is extremely inefficient.
The efficiency is measured by the retrieval rate which is the ratio of the number of retrieved
desired message symbols to the number of total downloaded symbols. The capacity of PIR
is the maximum retrieval rate over all possible PIR schemes.
The computer science formulation of this problem assumes that the messages are of
length one. The metrics in this case are the download cost, i.e., the sum of lengths of
the answer strings, and the upload cost, i.e., the size of the queries. Most of this work
is computational PIR as it ensures only that a server cannot get any information about
user intent unless it solves a certain computationally hard problem [2, 5]. The information-
theoretic re-formulation of the problem considers arbitrarily large message sizes, and ignores
the upload cost. This formulation provides an absolute, i.e., information-theoretic, guarantee
that no server participating in the protocol gets any information about the user intent.
Towards that end, recently, [6] has drawn a connection between the PIR problem and the
blind interference alignment scheme proposed in [7]. Then, [8] has determined the exact
capacity of the classical PIR problem. The retrieval scheme in [8] is based on three principles:
message symmetry, symmetry across databases, and exploiting side information from the
undesired messages through alignment.
The basic PIR setting has been extended in several interesting directions. The first
extension is the coded PIR (CPIR) problem [9–11]. The contents of the databases in this
problem are coded by an (N,K) storage code instead of being replicated. This is a natural
extension since most storage systems nowadays are in fact coded to achieve reliability against
node failures and erasures with manageable storage cost. In [12], the exact capacity of
the MDS-coded PIR is determined. Another interesting extension is PIR with colluding
databases (TPIR). In this setting, T databases can communicate and exchange the queries
to identify the desired message. The exact capacity of colluded PIR is determined in [13].
The case of coded colluded PIR is investigated in [14]. The robust PIR problem (RPIR)
extension considers the case when some databases are not responsive [13]. Lastly, in the
symmetric PIR problem (SPIR) the privacy of the remaining records should be maintained
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against the user in addition to the usual privacy constraint on the databases, i.e., the user
should not learn any other messages other than the one it wished to retrieve. The exact
capacity of symmetric PIR is determined in [15]; and the exact capacity of symmetric PIR
from coded databases is determined in [16].
In some applications, the user may be interested in retrieving multiple messages from
the databases without revealing the identities of these messages. Returning to the examples
presented earlier: the investor may be interested in comparing the values of multiple records
at the same time, and the inventor may be looking up several patents that are closely related
to their work. One possible solution to this problem is to use single-message retrieval scheme
in [8] successively. We show in this work that multiple messages can be retrieved more
efficiently than retrieving them one-by-one in a sequence. This resembles superiority of joint
decoding in multiple access channels over multiple simultaneous single-user transmissions
[17]. To motivate the multi-message private information retrieval problem (MPIR), consider
the example in [8, Section 4.3] where the number of messages isM = 3, number of databases
is N = 2, and the user is interested in retrieving only P = 1 message. Here the optimal
scheme retrieves 8 desired bits in 14 downloads, hence with a rate 4/7. When the user wishes
to retrieve P = 2 messages, if we use the scheme in [8] twice in a row, we retrieve 16 bits
in 28 downloads, hence again a sum rate of 4/7. Even considering the fact that the scheme
in [8] retrieves 2 bits of the second message for free in downloading the first message, i.e., it
actually retrieves 10 bits in 14 downloads, hence a sum rate of 5/7, we show in this paper
that a better sum rate of 4/5 can be achieved by joint retrieval of the messages.
Although there is a vast literature on classical PIR in the computer science literature,
only a few works exist in MPIR, such as: [18] which proposes a multi-block (multi-message)
scheme and observes that if the user requests multiple blocks (messages), it is possible
to reuse randomly mixed data blocks (answer strings) across multiple requests (queries).
[19] develops a multi-block scheme which further reduces the communication overhead. [20]
develops an achievable scheme for the multi-block PIR by designing k-safe binary matrices
that uses XOR operations. [20] extends the scheme in [1] to multiple blocks. [21] designs
an efficient non-trivial multi-query computational PIR protocol and gives a lower bound on
the communication of any multi-query information retrieval protocol. These works do not
consider determining the information-theoretic capacity.
In this paper, we formulate the MPIR problem with non-colluding repeated databases
from an information-theoretic perspective. Our goal is to characterize the sum capacity of
the MPIR problem CPs , which is defined as the maximum ratio of the number of retrieved
symbols from the P desired messages to the number of total downloaded symbols. When
the number of desired messages P is at least half of the total number of messages M , i.e.,
P ≥ M
2
, we determine the exact sum capacity of MPIR as CPs =
1
1+M−P
PN
. We use a novel
achievable scheme which downloads MDS-coded mixtures of all messages. We show that
joint retrieving of the desired messages strictly outperforms successive use of single-message
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retrieval for P times. Additionally, we present an achievable rate region to characterize the
trade-off between the retrieval rates of the desired P messages.
For the case of P ≤ M
2
, we derive lower and upper bounds that match if the total number
of messagesM is an integer multiple of the number of desired messages P , i.e., M
P
∈ N. In this
case, the sum capacity is CPs =
1− 1
N
1−( 1
N
)M/P
. The result resembles the single-message capacity
with the number of messages equal to M
P
. In other cases, although the exact capacity is still
an open problem, we show numerically that the gap between the lower and upper bounds is
monotonically decreasing in N and is upper bounded by 0.0082. The achievable scheme when
P ≤ M
2
is inspired by the greedy algorithm in [8], which retrieves all possible combinations of
messages. The main difference of our scheme from the scheme in [8] is the number of stages
required in each download round. For example, round M − P + 1 to round M − 1, which
correspond to retrieving the sum of M − P + 1 to sum of M − 1 messages, respectively, are
suppressed in our scheme. This is because, they do not generate any useful side information
for our purposes here, in contrast to [8]. Interestingly, the number of stages for each round
is related to the output of a P -order IIR filter [22]. Our converse proof generalizes the proof
in [8] for P ≥ 1. The essence of the proof is captured in two lemmas: the first lemma lower
bounds the uncertainty of the interference for the case P ≥ M
2
, and the second lemma upper
bounds the remaining uncertainty after conditioning on P interfering messages.
2 Problem Formulation
Consider a classical PIR setting storingM messages (or files). Each message is a vectorWi ∈
F
L
q , i ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, whose elements are picked uniformly and independently from sufficiently
large field Fq. Denote the contents of messageWm by the vector [wm(1), wm(2), · · · , wm(L)]T .
The messages are independent and identically distributed, and thus,
H(Wi) = L, i ∈ {1, · · · ,M} (1)
H (W1:M) = ML (2)
where W1:M = (W1,W2, · · · ,WM). The messages are stored in N non-colluding (non-
communicating) databases. Each database stores an identical copy of all M messages, i.e.,
the databases encode the messages via (N, 1) repetition storage code [12].
In the MPIR problem, the user aims to retrieve a subset of messages indexed by the index
set P = {i1, · · · , iP} ⊆ {1, · · · ,M} out of the available messages, where |P| = P , without
leaking the identity of the subset P. We assume that the cardinality of the potential message
set, P , is known to all databases. To retrieve WP = (Wi1 ,Wi2, · · · ,WiP ), the user generates
a query Q
[P]
n and sends it to the nth database. The user does not have any knowledge about
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the messages in advance, hence the messages and the queries are statistically independent,
I
(
W1, · · · ,WM ;Q[P]1 , · · · , Q[P]N
)
= I
(
W1:M ;Q
[P]
1:N
)
= 0 (3)
The privacy is satisfied by ensuring statistical independence between the queries and the
message index set P = {i1, · · · , iP}, i.e., the privacy constraint is given by,
I
(
Q[i1,··· ,iP ]n ; i1, · · · , iP
)
= I
(
Q[P]n ;P
)
= 0, n ∈ {1, · · · , N} (4)
The nth database responds with an answer string A
[P]
n , which is a deterministic function of
the queries and the messages, hence
H(A[P]n |Q[P]n ,W1:M) = 0 (5)
We further note that by the data processing inequality and (4),
I
(
A[P]n ;P
)
= 0, n ∈ {1, · · · , N} (6)
In addition, the user should be able to reconstruct the messages WP reliably from the col-
lected answers from all databases given the knowledge of the queries. Thus, we write the
reliability constraint as,
H
(
Wi1 , · · · ,WiP |A[P]1 , · · · , A[P]N , Q[P]1 , · · · , Q[P]N
)
= H
(
WP |A[P]1:N , Q[P]1:N
)
= 0 (7)
We denote the retrieval rate of the ith message by Ri, where i ∈ P. The retrieval rate of
the ith message is the ratio between the length of message i and the total download cost of
the message set P that includes Wi. Hence,
Ri =
H(Wi)∑N
n=1H
(
A
[P]
n
) (8)
The sum retrieval rate of WP is given by,
P∑
i=1
Ri =
H(WP)∑N
n=1H
(
A
[P]
n
) = PL∑N
n=1H
(
A
[P]
n
) (9)
The sum capacity of the MPIR problem is given by
CPs = sup
P∑
i=1
Ri (10)
where the sup is over all private retrieval schemes.
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In this paper, we follow the information-theoretic assumptions of large enough message
size, large enough field size, and ignore the upload cost as in [8,11–13]. A formal treatment
of the capacity under message and field size constraints for P = 1 can be found in [23].
We note that the MPIR problem described here reduces to the classical PIR problem when
P = 1, whose capacity is characterized in [8].
3 Main Results and Discussions
Our first result is the exact characterization of the sum capacity for the case P ≥ M
2
, i.e.,
when the user wishes to privately retrieve at least half of the messages stored in the databases.
Theorem 1 For the MPIR problem with non-colluding and replicated databases, if the num-
ber of desired messages P is at least half of the number of overall stored messages M , i.e.,
if P ≥ M
2
, then the sum capacity is given by,
CPs =
1
1 + M−P
PN
(11)
The achievability proof for Theorem 1 is given in Section 4, and the converse proof is
given in Section 6.1. We note that when P = 1, the constraint of Theorem 1 is equivalent
to M = 2, and the result in (11) reduces to the known result of [8] for P = 1, M = 2, which
is 1
1+ 1
N
. We observe that the sum capacity in (11) is a strictly increasing function of N ,
and CPs → 1 as N →∞. We also observe that the sum capacity in this regime is a strictly
increasing function of P , and approaches 1 as P →M .
The following corollary compares our result and the rate corresponding to the repeated
use of single-message retrieval scheme [8].
Corollary 1 For the MPIR problem with P ≥ M
2
, the repetition of the single-message re-
trieval scheme of [8] P times in a row, which achieves a sum rate of,
Rreps =
(N − 1)(NM−1 + P − 1)
NM − 1 (12)
is strictly sub-optimal with respect to the exact capacity in (11).
Proof: In order to use the single-message capacity achieving PIR scheme as an MPIR
scheme, the user repeats the single-message achievable scheme for each individual message
that belongs to P. We note that at each repetition, the scheme downloads extra decodable
symbols from other messages. By this argument, the following rate Rreps is achievable using
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a repetition of the single-message scheme,
Rreps = C +∆(M,P,N) (13)
where C is the single-message capacity which is given by C =
1− 1
N
1−( 1
N
)M
[8], and ∆(M,P,N) is
the rate of the extra decodable symbols that belong to P. To calculate ∆(M,P,N), we note
that the total download cost D is given by D = L
C
by definition. Since L = NM in the single-
message scheme, D =
NM (1−( 1
N
)M )
1− 1
N
= N
M+1−N
N−1
. The single-message scheme downloads one
symbol from every message from every database, i.e., the scheme downloads extra (P − 1)N
symbols from the remaining desired messages that belong to P, thus,
∆(M,P,N) =
(P − 1)N(N − 1)
NM+1 −N =
(P − 1)(N − 1)
NM − 1 (14)
Using this in (13) gives the Rreps expression in (12).
Now, the difference between the capacity in (11) and achievable rate in (12) is,
CPs − Rreps =
PN
P (N − 1) +M −
(N − 1)(NM−1 + P − 1)
NM − 1 (15)
=
η(P,M,N)
(NM − 1)(P (N − 1) +M) (16)
It suffices to prove that η(P,M,N) ≥ 0 for all P , M , N when P ≥ M
2
and N ≥ 2. Note,
η(P,M,N) =(2P −M)NM + (M − P )NM−1 − P (P − 1)N2
+ ((P − 1)(2P −M)− P )N + (M − P )(P − 1) (17)
In the regime P ≥ M
2
, coefficients of NM , NM−1, N0 are non-negative. Denote the negative
terms in η(·) by ν(P,N) which is ν(P,N) = P (P − 1)N2 + PN . We note ν(P,N) < P 2N2
when N > 1, which is the case here. Thus,
η(P,M,N) ≥(2P −M)NM + (M − P )NM−1
+ (P − 1)(2P −M)N + (M − P )(P − 1)− P 2N2 (18)
>(2P −M)NM + (M − P )NM−1 − P 2N2 (19)
=N2
(
(2P −M)NM−2 + (M − P )NM−3 − P 2) (20)
≥N2 ((2P −M)2M−2 + (M − P )2M−3 − P 2) (21)
=N2
(
2M−3(3P −M)− P 2) (22)
≥N2
(
2M−3 · M
2
−M2
)
(23)
=MN2
(
2M−4 −M) (24)
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where (21) follows from the fact that (2P −M)NM−2 + (M − P )NM−3 − P 2 is monotone
increasing in N ≥ 2 for M ≥ 3, and (23) follows from M
2
≤ P ≤ M . From (24), we conclude
that η(M,P,N) > 0 for allM ≥ 7, P ≥ M
2
and N ≥ 2. Examining the expression in (17) for
the remaining cases manually, i.e., when M ≤ 6, we note that η(M,P,N) > 0 in these cases
as well. Therefore, η(M,P,N) > 0 for all possible cases, and the MPIR capacity is strictly
larger than the rate achieved by repeating the optimum single-message PIR scheme. 
For the example in the introduction, where M = 3, P = 2, N = 2, our MPIR scheme
achieves a sum capacity of 4
5
in (11), which is strictly larger than the repeating-based achiev-
able sum rate of 5
7
in (12).
The following corollary gives an achievable rate region for the MPIR problem.
Corollary 2 For the MPIR problem, for the case P ≥ M
2
, the following rate region is
achievable,
C = conv {(C, δ, · · · , δ), (δ, C, · · · , δ), · · · , (δ, · · · , δ, C), (C, 0, 0, · · · , 0),
(0, C, 0, · · · , 0), · · · , (0, 0, · · · , C), (0, 0, · · · , 0), (CP , CP , · · · , CP )} (25)
where
C =
1− 1
N
1− ( 1
N
)M
, CP =
CPs
P
=
N
PN + (M − P ) , δ =
∆(M,P,N)
P − 1 =
N − 1
NM − 1 (26)
and where conv denotes the convex hull, and all corner points lie in the P -dimensional space.
Proof: This is a direct consequence of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1. The corner point(
C, ∆(M,P,N)
P−1
, ∆(M,P,N)
P−1
, · · · , ∆(M,P,N)
P−1
)
=
(
1− 1
N
1−( 1
N
)M
, N−1
NM−1
, N−1
NM−1
, · · · , N−1
NM−1
)
is achievable from
the single-message achievable scheme. Due to the symmetry of the problem any other per-
mutation for the coordinates of this corner point is also achievable by changing the roles of
the desired messages. Theorem 1 gives the symmetric sum capacity corner point for the case
of P ≥ M
2
, namely
(
CPs
P
, C
P
s
P
, · · · , CPs
P
)
=
(
N
PN+(M−P )
, N
PN+(M−P )
, · · · , N
PN+(M−P )
)
. By time
sharing of these corner points along with the origin, the region in (25) is achievable. 
As an example for this achievable region, consider again the example in the introduction,
where M = 3, P = 2, N = 2. In this case, we have a two-dimensional rate region with three
corner points: (4
7
, 1
7
), which corresponds to the single-message capacity achieving point that
aims at retrieving W1; (
1
7
, 4
7
), which corresponds to single-message capacity achieving point
that aims at retrieving W2; and (
2
5
, 2
5
), which corresponds to the symmetric sum capacity
point. The convex hull of these corner points together with the points on the axes gives the
achievable region in Fig. 1.
For the case P ≤ M
2
, we have the following result, where the lower and upper bound
match if M
P
∈ N.
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(17,
4
7)
(47,
1
7)
(25,
2
5)
R1
R2
Figure 1: The achievable rate region of M = 3, P = 2, N = 2.
Theorem 2 For the MPIR problem with non-colluding and replicated databases, when P ≤
M
2
, the sum capacity is lower and upper bounded as,
¯
Rs ≤ CPs ≤ R¯s (27)
where the upper bound R¯s is given by,
R¯s =
1
1 + 1
N
+ · · ·+ 1
N⌊
M
P
⌋−1
+
(
M
P
− ⌊M
P
⌋) 1
N⌊
M
P
⌋
(28)
=
1
1−( 1
N
)⌊
M
P
⌋
1− 1
N
+
(
M
P
− ⌊M
P
⌋)
1
N⌊MP ⌋
(29)
For the lower bound, define ri as,
ri =
ej2pi(i−1)/P
N1/P − ej2pi(i−1)/P , i = 1, · · · , P (30)
where j =
√−1, and denote γi, i = 1, · · · , P , to be the solutions of the linear equations∑P
i=1 γir
−P
i = (N − 1)M−P , and
∑P
i=1 γir
−k
i = 0, k = 1, · · · , P − 1, then ¯Rs is given by,
¯
Rs =
∑P
i=1 γir
M−P
i
[(
1 + 1
ri
)M
−
(
1 + 1
ri
)M−P]
∑P
i=1 γir
M−P
i
[(
1 + 1
ri
)M
− 1
] (31)
The achievability lower bound in Theorem 2 is shown in Section 5 and the upper bound
is derived in Section 6.2. The following corollary states that the bounds in Theorem 2 match
if the total number of messages is an integer multiple of the number of desired messages.
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Corollary 3 For the MPIR problem with non-colluding and replicated databases, if M
P
is an
integer, then the bounds in (27) match, and hence,
CPs =
1− 1
N
1− ( 1
N
)
M
P
,
M
P
∈ N (32)
Proof: For the upper bound, observe that if M
P
∈ N, then M
P
=
⌊
M
P
⌋
. Hence, (28) becomes
R¯s =
1− 1
N
1− ( 1
N
)
M
P
(33)
For the lower bound, consider the case M
P
∈ N. From (30),
(
1 +
1
ri
)M
=
(
N1/P
ej2pi(i−1)/P
)M
= N
M
P (34)
since ej2pi(i−1)M/P = 1 for M
P
∈ N. Similarly,
(
1 + 1
ri
)M−P
= N
M
P
−1. Hence, if M
P
∈ N,
¯
Rs =
∑P
i=1 γir
M−P
i
[
N
M
P −N MP −1
]
∑P
i=1 γir
M−P
i
[
N
M
P − 1
] (35)
=
N
M
P −N MP −1
N
M
P − 1
(36)
=
1− 1
N
1− ( 1
N
)
M
P
(37)
Thus,
¯
Rs = C
P
s = R¯s if
M
P
∈ N, and we have an exact capacity result in this case. 
Examining the result, we observe that when the total number of messages is an integer
multiple of the number of desired messages, the sum capacity of the MPIR is the same as
the capacity of the single-message PIR with the number of messages equal to M
P
. Note that,
although at first the result may seem as if every P messages can be lumped together as a
single message, and the achievable scheme in [8] can be used, this is not the case. The reason
for this is that, we need to ensure the privacy constraint for every subset of messages of size
P . That is why, in this paper, we develop a new achievable scheme.
The state of the results is summarized in Fig. 2: Consider the (M,P ) plane, where
naturally M ≥ P . The valid part of the plane is divided into two regions. The first region
is confined between the lines P = M
2
and P =M ; the sum capacity in this region is exactly
characterized (Theorem 1). The second region is confined between the lines P = 1 and
P = M
2
; the sum capacity in this region is characterized only for the cases when M
P
∈ N
(Corollary 3). The line P = 1 corresponds to the previously known result for the single-
message PIR [8]. The exact capacity for the rest of the cases is still an open problem; however,
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Sun-Jafar [8]
M
CPs =
1
1+M−PPN
P
P =
M
2
P
=
M
CPs =
1− 1N
1−( 1N )M/P
, if M
P
∈ N
P = 1
Figure 2: Summary of the state of the results.
the achievable scheme in Theorem 2 yields near-optimal sum rates for all the remaining cases
with the largest difference of 0.0082 from the upper bound, as discussed next.
Fig. 3 shows the difference of the achievable rate
¯
Rs and the upper bound R¯s in Theorem 2.
The figure shows that the difference decreases as N increases. This difference in all cases
is small and is upper bounded by 0.0082, which occurs when M = 5, P = 2, N = 2. In
addition, the difference is zero for the cases P ≥ M
2
(Theorem 1) or M
P
∈ N (Corollary 3).
Fig. 4 shows the effect of changing M for fixed (P,N). We observe that as M increases,
the sum rate monotonically decreases and has a limit of 1 − 1
N
. In addition, Fig. 5 shows
the effect of changing N for fixed (P,M). We observe that as N increases, the sum rate
increases and approaches 1, as expected.
4 Achievability Proof for the Case P ≥ M2
In this section, we present the general achievable scheme that attains the upper bound for
the case P ≥ M
2
. The scheme applies the concepts of message symmetry, database symmetry,
and exploiting side information as in [8]. However, our scheme requires the extra ingredient
of MDS coding of the desired symbols and the side information in its second stage.
4.1 Motivating Example: M = 3, P = 2 Messages, N = 2 Databases
We start with a simple motivating example in this sub-section. The scheme operates over
message size N2 = 4. For sake of clarity, we assume that the three messages after interleaving
their indices are W1 = (a1, · · · , a4)T , W2 = (b1, · · · , b4)T , and W3 = (c1, · · · , c4)T . We use
11
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Figure 3: Deviation of the achievable sum rate from the upper bound.
G2×3 Reed-Solomon generator matrix over F3 as
G2×3 =
[
1 1 1
1 2 3
]
(38)
The user picks a random permutation for the columns of G2×3 from the 6 possible permuta-
tions, e.g., in this example we use the permutation 2, 1, 3. In the first round, the user starts
by downloading one symbol from each database and each message, i.e., the user downloads
(a1, b1, c1) from the first database, and (a2, b2, c2) from the second database. In the second
round, the user encodes the side information from database 2 which is c2 with two new
symbols from W1,W2 which are (a3, b3) using the permuted generator matrix, i.e., the user
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Figure 4: Effect of changing M for fixed P = 5, 6, 10 and fixed N = 2.
downloads two equations from database 1 in the second round,
GS1

a3b3
c2

 =
[
1 1 1
1 2 3
]0 1 01 0 0
0 0 1



a3b3
c2

 =
[
a3 + b3 + c2
2a3 + b3 + 3c2
]
(39)
The user repeats this operation for the second database with (a4, b4) as desired symbols and
c1 as the side information from the first database.
For the decodability: The user subtracts out c2 from round two in the first database,
then the user can decode (a3, b3) from a3 + b3 and 2a3 + b3. Similarly, by subtracting out c1
from round two in the second database, the user can decode (a4, b4) from a4+b4 and 2a4+b4.
For the privacy: Single bit retrievals of (a1, b1, c1) and (a2, b2, c2) from the two databases
in the first round satisfy message symmetry and database symmetry, and do not leak any
information. In addition, due to the private shuffling of bit indices, the different coefficients
of 1, 2 and 3 in front of the bits in the MDS-coded summations in the second round do not
leak any information either; see a formal proof in Section 4.3. To see the privacy constraint
intuitively from another angle, we note that the user can alter the queries for the second
database when the queries for the first database are fixed, when the user wishes to retrieve
another set of two messages. For instance, if the user wishes to retrieve (W1,W3) instead of
(W1,W2), it can alter the queries for the second database by changing every c2 in the queries
of the second database with c3, c1 with c4, b2 with b3, and b4 with b1.
The query table for this case is shown in Table 1 below. The scheme retrieves a1, · · · , a4
and b1, · · · , b4, i.e., 8 bits in 10 downloads (5 from each database). Thus, the achievable
sum rate for this scheme is 8
10
= 4
5
= 1
1+M−P
PN
. If we use the single-message optimal scheme
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in [8], which is given in [8, Example 4.3] for this specific case, twice in a row to retrieve two
messages, we achieve a sum rate of 20
28
= 5
7
< 4
5
as discussed in the introduction.
Table 1: The query table for the case M = 3, P = 2, N = 2.
Database 1 Database 2
a1, b1, c1 a2, b2, c2
a3 + b3 + c2 a4 + b4 + c1
2a3 + b3 + 3c2 2a4 + b4 + 3c1
4.2 General Achievable Scheme
The scheme requires L = N2, and is completed in two rounds. The main ingredient of the
scheme is MDS coding of the desired symbols and side information in the second round. The
details of the scheme are as follows.
1. Index preparation: The user interleaves the contents of each message randomly and
independently from the remaining messages using a random interleaver pim(.) which is
known privately to the user only, i.e.,
xm(i) = wm(pim(i)), i ∈ {1, · · · , L} (40)
where Xm = [xm(1), · · · , xm(L)]T is the interleaved message. Thus, the downloaded
symbol xm(i) at any database appears to be chosen at random and independent from
the desired message subset P.
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2. Round one: As in [8], the user downloads one symbol from every message from every
database, i.e., the user downloads (x1(n), x2(n), · · · , xM (n)) from the nth database.
This implements message symmetry, symmetry across databases and satisfies the pri-
vacy constraint.
3. Round two: The user downloads a coded mixture of new symbols from the desired
messages and the undesired symbols downloaded from the other databases. Specifically,
(a) The user picks an MDS generator matrix G ∈ FP×Mq , which has the property that
every P × P submatrix is full-rank. This implies that if the user can cancel out
any M − P symbols from the mixture, the remaining symbols can be decoded.
One explicit MDS generator matrix is the Reed-Solomon generator matrix over
Fq, where q > M , [24, 25]
G =


1 1 1 · · · 1
1 2 3 · · · M
12 22 32 · · · M2
...
...
...
...
...
1P−1 2P−1 3P−1 · · · MP−1


P×M
(41)
(b) The user picks uniformly and independently at random the permutation matrices
S1,S2, · · · ,SN−1 of size M ×M . These matrices shuffle the order of columns of
G to be independent of P.
(c) At the first database, the user downloads an MDS-coded version of P new symbols
from the desired set P and M − P undesired symbols that are already decoded
from the second database in the first round, i.e., the user downloads P equations
of the form
GS1
[
xi1(n+ 1) xi2(n+ 1) · · · xiP (n+ 1) xj1(2) xj2(2) · · · xjM−P (2)
]T
(42)
where P = {i1, i2, · · · , iP} are the indices of the desired messages and P¯ =
{j1, j2, · · · , jM−P} are the indices of the undesired messages. In this case, the
user can cancel out the undesired messages and be left with a P × P invertible
system of equations that it can solve to get [xi1(n+1), xi2(n+1), · · · , xiP (n+1)].
This implements exploiting side information as in [8].
(d) The user repeats the last step for each set of side information from database 3 to
database N , each with different permutation matrix.
(e) By database symmetry, the user repeats all steps of round two at all other databases.
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4.3 Decodability, Privacy, and Calculation of the Achievable Rate
Now, we verify that this achievable scheme satisfies the reliability and privacy constraints.
For the reliability: The user gets individual symbols from all databases in the first round,
and hence they are all decodable by definition. In the second round, the user can subtract
out all the undesired message symbols using the undesired symbols downloaded from all
other databases during the first round. Consequently, the user is left with a P × P system
of equations which is guaranteed to be invertible by the MDS property, hence all symbols
that belong to WP are decodable.
For the privacy: At each database, for every message subset P of size P , the achievable
scheme retrieves randomly interleaved symbols which are encoded by the following matrix:
HP =


IP 0P 0P · · · 0P
0P G
1
P 0P · · · 0P
0P 0P G
2
P · · · 0P
...
...
...
...
...
0P 0P 0P · · · GN−1P


(43)
where GnP = GSn(:,P) are the columns of the encoding matrix that correspond to the mes-
sage subset P after applying the random permutation Sn. Since the permutation matrices
are chosen uniformly and independently from each other, the probability distribution of HP
is uniform irrespective to P (the probability of realizing such a matrix is
(
(M−P )!
M !
)N−1
).
Furthermore, the symbols are chosen randomly and uniformly by applying the random in-
terleaver. Hence, the retrieval scheme is private.
To calculate the achievable rate: We note that at each database, the user downloads M
individual symbols in the first round that includes P desired symbols. The user exploits the
side information from the remaining (N−1) databases to generate P equations for each side
information set. Each set of P equations in turn generates P desired symbols. Hence, the
achievable rate is calculated as,
P∑
i=1
Ri =
total number of desired symbols
total downloaded equations
(44)
=
N(P + P (N − 1))
N(M + P (N − 1)) (45)
=
PN
(M − P ) + PN (46)
=
1
1 + M−P
PN
(47)
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4.4 Further Examples for the Case P ≥ M2
In this section, we illustrate our achievable scheme with two more basic examples. In Sec-
tion 4.1, we considered the case M = 3, P = 2, N = 2. In the next two sub-sections, we will
consider examples with larger M , P (Section 4.4.1), and larger N (Section 4.4.2).
4.4.1 M = 5 Messages, P = 3 Messages, N = 2 Databases
Let P = {1, 2, 3}, and a to e denote the contents of W1 to W5, respectively. The achievable
scheme is similar to the example in Section 4.1. The difference is the use 5× 5 permutation
matrix for S1 and G3×5 Reed-Solomon generator matrix over F5 as:
G3×5 =


1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5
1 4 4 1 0

 (48)
The query table is shown in Table 2 below with the following random permutation for
the columns: 2, 5, 1, 3, 4. The reliability and privacy constraints are satisfied due to the
MDS property that implies that any subset of 3 messages corresponds to a 3 × 3 invertible
submatrix if the remaining symbols are decodable from the other database. This scheme
retrieves a1, · · · , a4, b1, · · · , b4 and c1, · · · , c4, hence 12 bits in 16 downloads (8 from each
database). Thus, the achievable sum rate is 12
16
= 3
4
which equals the sum capacity 1
1+M−P
PN
in (11). This strictly outperforms the repetition-based achievable sum rate 18
31
in (12).
Table 2: The query table for the case M = 5, P = 3, N = 2.
Database 1 Database 2
a1, b1, c1, d1, e1 a2, b2, c2, d2, e2
a3 + b3 + c3 + d2 + e2 a4 + b4 + c4 + d1 + e1
2a3 + 5b3 + c3 + 3d2 + 4e2 2a4 + 5b4 + c4 + 3d1 + 4e1
4a3 + c3 + 4d2 + e2 4a4 + c4 + 4d1 + e1
4.4.2 M = 4 Messages, P = 2 Messages, N = 3 Databases
Next, we give an example with a larger N . Here, the message size is N2 = 9. With a
generator matrix G2×4 = G3×5([1 : 2], [1 : 4]) to be the upper left submatrix of the previous
example and two set of random permutations (corresponding to S1,S2) as 1, 3, 2, 4, and
4, 1, 3, 2. The query table is shown in Table 3 below. This scheme retrieves a1, · · · , a9 and
b1, · · · , b9, hence 18 bits in 24 downloads (8 from each database). Thus, the achievable rate
is 18
24
= 3
4
= 1
1+M−P
PN
. This strictly outperforms the repetition-based achievable scheme sum
rate 7
10
in (12).
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Table 3: The query table for the case M = 4, P = 2, N = 3.
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
a1, b1, c1, d1 a2, b2, c2, d2 a3, b3, c3, d3
a4 + b4 + c2 + d2 a6 + b6 + c1 + d1 a8 + b8 + c1 + d1
a4 + 3b4 + 2c2 + 4d2 a6 + 3b6 + 2c1 + 4d1 a8 + 3b8 + 2c1 + 4d1
a5 + b5 + c3 + d3 a7 + b7 + c3 + d3 a9 + b9 + c2 + d2
4a5 + b5 + 3c3 + 2d3 4a7 + b7 + 3c3 + 2d3 4a9 + b9 + 3c2 + 2d2
5 Achievability Proof for the Case P ≤ M2
In this section, we describe an achievable scheme for the case P ≤ M
2
. We show that this
scheme is optimal when the total number of messages M is an integer multiple of the number
of desired messages P . The scheme incurs a small loss from the upper bound for all other
cases. The scheme generalizes the ideas in [8]. Different than [8], our scheme uses unequal
number of stages for each round of download. Interestingly, the number of stages at each
round can be thought of as the output of an all-poles IIR filter. Our scheme reduces to [8]
if we let P = 1. In the sequel, we define the ith round as the download queries that retrieve
sum of i different symbols. We define the stage as a block of queries that exhausts all
(
M
i
)
combinations of the sum of i symbols in the ith round.
5.1 Motivating Example: M = 5, P = 2 Messages, N = 2 Databases
To motivate our achievable scheme, consider the case of retrieving two messages denoted
by letters (a, b) from five stored messages denoted by letters (a, b, c, d, e). Instead of design-
ing the queries beginning from the top as usual, i.e., beginning by downloading individual
symbols, we design the scheme backwards starting from the last round that corresponds to
downloading sums of all five messages and trace back to identify the side information needed
at each round from the other database. Our steps described below can be followed through
in the query table in Table 4.
Now, let us fix the number of stages in the 5th round to be 1 as in [8] since N = 2. Round
5 corresponds to downloading the sum of all five messages and contains one combination of
symbols a+ b+ c+ d+ e; please see the last line in Table 4. Since we wish to retrieve (a, b),
we need one side information equation in the form of c + d + e from earlier rounds. The
combination c+d+e can be created directly from round 3 without using round 4. Hence, we
suppress round 4, as it does not create any useful side information in our case, and download
one stage from round 3 to generate one side information equation c+ d+ e.
In round 3, we download sums of 3 messages. Each stage of round 3 consists of
(
5
3
)
= 10
equations. One of those 10 equations is in the desired c + d + e form, and the remaining 9
of them have either a or b or both a, b in them. In tabulating all these 9 combinations, we
recognize two categories of side information equations needed from earlier rounds. The first
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category corresponds to equations of the form a+ b+ (c, d, e), where (c, d, e) means possible
choices for the rest of the equation, i.e., these equations have both a and b in them and plus
one more symbol in the form of c or d or e. This category requires downloading one stage
of individual symbols (i.e., an individual c or d or e), that is, one stage of round 1. We note
also that one of the symbols (a, b) should be known as a side information from the second
database in order to solve for the remaining new symbol. The second category corresponds
to equations of the form a+(c+d, c+e, d+e) and b+(c+d, c+e, d+e), i.e., these equations
have only one of a or b but not both. This category requires two stages of round 2, as we
need different side information equations that contain sum of twos, e.g., c+ d, c+ e, d+ e.
In round 2, we download sums of 2 messages. Each stage of the second round contains(
5
2
)
= 10 equations. In each stage, we need one category of side information equations, which
is a + (c, d, e) and b + (c, d, e). This necessitates two different stages of individual symbols,
i.e., two stages of round 1 for each stage of round 2.
Denoting αi to be the number of stages needed for the ith round, we sum all the required
stages for round 1 to be α1 = 2 · 2 + 1 = 5 stages. Hence, the user identifies the number
stages as α1 = 5, α2 = 2, α3 = 1, α4 = 0, α5 = 1. These can be observed in the query table
in Table 4. Note that, we have α1 = 5 stages in round 1 where we download individual bits;
then we have α2 = 2 stages in round 2 where we download sums of two symbols; then we
have α3 = 1 stage in round 3 where we download sums of three symbols; we skip round 4 as
α4 = 0; and we have α5 = 1 stage of round 5 where we download sum of all five symbols.
Now, after designing the structure of the queries and the number of stages needed for each
round, we apply the rest of the scheme described in [8]. The user randomly interleaves the
messages as usual. In the first round, the user downloads one symbol from each message at
each database. This is repeated α1 = 5 times for each database. Hence, the user downloads
a1:10, b1:10, c1:10, d1:10, e1:10 from the two databases. In the second round, the user downloads
sums of two messages. Each stage contains
(
5
2
)
= 10 equations. This is repeated α2 = 2
times. For example, in database 1, user exploits c6, d6, e6 to get a12, a13, a14 and c7, d7, e7 to
obtain b11, b12, b13. These are from round 1. Round 2 generates c11 + d11, c12 + e11, d12 + e12
from stage 1, and c13 + d13, c14 + e13, d14 + e14 from stage 2 as side information for round 3.
In round 3, the user downloads sum of three symbols. There are
(
5
3
)
= 10 of them. Symbols
c10, d10, e10 downloaded from round 1 in database 2 are used to be summed with mixtures
of a + b. The two sets of side information generated in the second round are exploited in
the equations that have one a or b. Note that for each such equation, one of a or b is new
and the other one is decoded from database 2. Round 3 generates one side information as
c19+ d19+ e19 that is used in round 5. This last round includes the sum of all five messages.
Therefore, as seen in Table 4, we have retrieved a1, · · · , a34 and b1 · · · , b34, i.e., 68 bits in
a total of 112 downloads (56 from each database). Thus, the achievable sum rate is 68
112
= 17
28
.
This is
¯
Rs in Theorem 2, whereas the upper bound R¯s in Theorem 2 is
1
1+ 1
N
+ 1
2N2
= 8
13
.
The gap between
¯
Rs and R¯s is equal to
3
364
≃ 0.0082, which also is the largest possible gap
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between
¯
Rs and R¯s over all possible values of M , P and N .
5.2 Calculation of the Number of Stages
The main new ingredient of our scheme in comparison to the scheme in [8] is the unequal
number of stages in each round. In [8], the scheme is completed in M rounds, and each
round contains only 1 stage only when N = 2. To generalize the ideas in Section 5.1 and
calculate the number of stages needed per round, we use Vandermonde’s identity
(
M
i
)
=
P∑
k=0
(
P
k
)(
M − P
i− k
)
(49)
The relation in (49) states that any combination of i objects from a group of M objects
must have k objects from a group of size P and i − k objects from a group of size M − P .
In our context, the first group is the subset of the desired messages and the second group is
the subset of the undesired messages. Then, the relation can be interpreted in our setting as
follows: In the ith round, the
(
M
i
)
combinations of all possible sums of i terms can be sorted
into P + 1 categories: The first category (i.e., k = 0), contains no terms from the desired
messages, the second category contains 1 term from the desired messages and i − 1 terms
from the undesired messages, etc. The relation gives also the number of query subgroups of
each category
(
P
k
)
and the number of queries in each subgroup
(
M−P
i−k
)
.
Let us consider the following concrete example for clarification: Consider that we have 6
messages denoted by (a, b, c, d, e, f), and the desired group to be retrieved is (a, b). Consider
round 4 that consists of all combinations of sums of 4 symbols. From Vandermonde’s identity,
we know that
(
6
4
)
=
(
2
0
)(
4
4
)
+
(
2
1
)(
4
3
)
+
(
2
2
)(
4
2
)
. Which means that there are three categories
of sums: First category is with only undesired messages; we have
(
2
0
)
= 1 query subgroup of
the form c + d + e + f . The second category is to have 1 term from the desired group and
the remaining are undesired; we have
(
2
1
)
= 2 query subgroups, one corresponds to a with
combinations of 3 terms from c, d, e, f , and the other to b with combinations of 3 terms from
c, d, e, f . Each query subgroup contains
(
4
3
)
queries, i.e., the first query subgroup is of the
form a+ (c + d+ e, c + d+ f, c+ e+ f, d+ e+ f) and the second query subgroup is of the
form b+ (c + d+ e, c + d+ f, c + e + f, d + e + f). Third category is to have 2 terms from
the desired group and 2 terms from the undesired group; we have
(
2
2
)
= 1 query subgroup
of this category that takes the form a+ b+ (c+ d, c+ e, · · · ). The number of queries of this
group is
(
4
2
)
corresponding to all combinations of 2 undesired symbols.
Back to the calculation of the number of stages: To be able to cancel the undesired
symbols from an i-term sum, the user needs to download these undesired symbols as side
information in the previous rounds. Hence, round i requires downloading
(
P
1
)
stages in round
(i− 1), (P
2
)
stages in round (i− 2), etc. Note that these stages need to be downloaded from
the remaining (N − 1) databases. Then, each database needs to download 1
N−1
(
P
1
)
stages in
Table 4: The query table for the case M = 5, P = 2, N = 2.
Database 1 Database 2
ro
u
n
d
1
stg 1 a1, b1, c1, d1, e1 a6, b6, c6, d6, e6
stg 2 a2, b2, c2, d2, e2 a7, b7, c7, d7, e7
stg 3 a3, b3, c3, d3, e3 a8, b8, c8, d8, e8
stg 4 a4, b4, c4, d4, e4 a9, b9, c9, d9, e9
stg 5 a5, b5, c5, d5, e5 a10, b10, c10, d10, e10
ro
u
n
d
2
st
ag
e
1
a11 + b6 a18 + b1
a12 + c6 a19 + c1
a13 + d6 a20 + d1
a14 + e6 a21 + e1
b11 + c7 b18 + c2
b12 + d7 b19 + d2
b13 + e7 b20 + e2
c11 + d11 c15 + d15
c12 + e11 c16 + e15
d12 + e12 d16 + e16
st
ag
e
2
a6 + b14 a1 + b21
a15 + c8 a22 + c3
a16 + d8 a23 + d3
a17 + e8 a24 + e3
b15 + c9 b22 + c4
b16 + d9 b23 + d4
b17 + e9 b24 + e4
c13 + d13 c17 + d17
c14 + e13 c18 + e17
d14 + e14 d18 + e18
ro
u
n
d
3
st
ag
e
1
a25 + b7 + c10 a2 + b29 + c5
a7 + b25 + d10 a30 + b2 + d5
a26 + b8 + e10 a3 + b30 + e5
a27 + c15 + d15 a31 + c11 + d11
a28 + c16 + e15 a32 + c12 + e11
a29 + d16 + e16 a33 + d12 + e12
b26 + c17 + d17 b31 + c13 + d13
b27 + c18 + e17 b32 + c14 + e13
b28 + d18 + e18 b33 + d14 + e14
c19 + d19 + e19 c20 + d20 + e20
rd
.
5
stg 1 a8 + b34 + c20 + d20 + e20 a34 + b3 + c19 + d19 + e19
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round (i− 1), 1
N−1
(
P
2
)
stages in round (i− 2), etc.
From this observation, we can trace back the number of stages needed at each round.
Denote αi to be the number of stages in round i. Fix the number of stages in the last
round (round M) to be αM = (N − 1)M−P stages. This choice ensures that the number of
stages in any round is an integer. Note that in round M , the user downloads a sum of all
M messages, this requires side information in the form of the sum of the undesired M − P
messages. Hence, we suppress the rounds M − P + 1 through M − 1 since they do not
generate any useful side information. Note that the side information equations in round M
at each database are collected from the remaining (N − 1) databases. Then, the number of
stages in round (M − P ) should be (N − 1)M−P−1. Therefore, we write
αM = (N − 1)M−P (50)
αM−1 = · · · = αM−P+1 = 0 (51)
αM−P = (N − 1)M−P−1 = 1
N − 1αM =
1
N − 1
P∑
i=1
(
P
i
)
αM−P+i (52)
Now, in round (M − P ), each stage requires (P
1
)
stages from round (M − P − 1), (P
2
)
stages from round (M − P − 2), and so on so forth, and these stages are divided across
(N − 1) databases. Continuing with the same argument, for each round, we write
αM−P−1 =
1
N − 1
(
P
1
)
αM−P =
1
N − 1
P∑
i=1
(
P
i
)
αM−P−1+i (53)
αM−P−2 =
1
N − 1
(
P
1
)
αM−P−1 +
1
N − 1
(
P
2
)
αM−P =
1
N − 1
P∑
i=1
(
P
i
)
αM−P−2+i (54)
...
αk =
1
N − 1
P∑
i=1
(
P
i
)
αk+i (55)
Interestingly, this pattern closely resembles the output of an IIR filter y[n] [22], with the
difference equation,
y[n] =
1
N − 1
P∑
i=1
(
P
i
)
y[n− i] (56)
and with the initial conditions y[−P ] = (N − 1)M−P , y[−P + 1] = · · · = y[−1] = 0. Note
that the only difference between the two seemingly different settings is the orientation of the
time axis. The calculation of the number of stages is obtained backwards in contrast to the
output of this IIR filter. Hence, we can systematically obtain the number of stages at each
round by observing the output of the IIR filter characterized by (56), and mapping it to the
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number of stages via αk = y[(M − P )− k].
We note that for the special case P = 1, the number of stages can be obtained from the
first order filter y[n] = 1
N−1
y[n− 1]. The output of this filter is y[n] = (N − 1)M−2−n. Then,
the number of stages in round k is αk = y[M − 1 − k] = (N − 1)k−1, which is exactly the
number of stages used in [8]; in particular if N = 2, then αk = 1 for all k.
5.3 General Achievable Scheme
1. Index preparation: The user interleaves the contents of each message randomly and
independently from the remaining messages using a random interleaver pim(.) which is
known privately to the user only, i.e.,
xm(i) = wm(pim(i)), i ∈ {1, · · · , L} (57)
2. Number of stages: We calculate the number of stages needed in each round. This can
be done systematically by finding the output of the IIR filter characterized by,
y[n] =
1
N − 1
P∑
i=1
(
P
i
)
y[n− i] (58)
with the initial conditions y[−P ] = (N − 1)M−P , y[−P + 1] = · · · = y[−1] = 0. The
number of stages in round i is αi = y[(M − P )− i] as discussed in Section 5.2.
3. Initialization: From the first database, the user downloads one symbol from each
message that belongs to the desired message set P. The user sets the round index to
i = 1.
4. Message symmetry: In round i, the user downloads sums of i terms from different
symbols from the first database. To satisfy the privacy constraint, the user should
download an equal amount of symbols from all messages. Therefore, the user downloads
the remaining
(
M−P
i
)
combinations in round i from the undesired symbol set P¯. For
example: In round 1, the user downloads one symbol from every undesired message
with a total of
(
M−P
1
)
=M − P such symbols.
5. Repetition of stages: In the first database, the user repeats the operation in round i
according to the number of calculated stages αi. This in total results in downloading
αi
(
M−P
i
)
undesired equations, and αi
((
M
i
)− (M−P
i
))
desired equations.
6. Symmetry across databases: The user implements symmetry across databases by down-
loading αi
(
M−P
i
)
new undesired equations, and αi
((
M
i
)− (M−P
i
))
new desired equa-
tions from each database. These undesired equations will be used as side information in
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subsequent rounds. For example: In round 1, each database generates α1(M − P ) un-
desired equations in the form of individual symbols. Hence, each database can exploit
up to α1(N − 1)(M − P ) side information equations from other (N − 1) databases.
7. Exploiting side information: Until now, we did not specify how the desired equations
are constructed. Since each stage in round i can be categorized using Vandermonde’s
identity as in the previous section, we form the desired equations as a sum of the
desired symbols and the undesired symbols that can be decoded from other databases
in the former (i − 1) rounds. If the user sums two or more symbols from P, the user
downloads one new symbol from one message only and the remaining symbols from P
should be derived from other databases. Thus, in round (i + 1), the user mixes one
symbol of P with the sum of i undesired symbols from round i. This should be repeated
for all
(
P
1
)
desired symbols. Then, the user mixes each sum of 2 desired symbols with
the sum of (i− 1) undesired symbols generated in the (i− 1)th round. This should be
repeated for all the
(
P
2
)
combinations of the desired symbols, and so on.
8. Repeating steps: Repeat steps 4, 5, 6, 7 by setting i = i+ 1 until i = M − P − 1.
9. Last round: We note that rounds M − P + 1 to M − 1 do not generate useful side
information. Hence, αM−P+1 = · · · = αM−1 = 0. In round M , which corresponds
to summing all M messages, the user mixes P symbols from P (only one of them is
new and the remaining are previously decoded from the other (N − 1) databases) and
M − P undesired symbol mixture that was generated in round (M − P ).
10. Shuffling the order of queries: After preparing the query table, the order of the queries
are shuffled uniformly, so that all possible orders of queries are equally likely regardless
of P.
5.4 Decodability, Privacy, and Calculation of the Achievable Rate
Now, we verify that the proposed scheme satisfies the reliability and privacy constraints.
For the reliability: The scheme is designed to download the exact number of undesired
equations that will be used as side information equation at subsequent rounds in other
databases.1 Hence, each desired symbol at any round is mixed with a known mixture of
symbols that can be decoded from other databases. Note that if the scheme encounters the
case of having a mixture of desired symbols, one of them only is chosen to be new and the
remaining symbols are downloaded previously from other databases. Thus, the reliability
constraint is satisfied by canceling out the side information.
1Check for instance in Table 4 that all of the downloads (equations) involving undesired symbols from
database 2 are used in database 1: singles c6, d6, e6, c7, d7, e7, c8, d8, e8, c9, d9, e9, c10, d10, e10; sums of twos
c15 + d15, c16 + e15, d16 + e16, c17 + d17, c18 + e17, d18 + e18; sum of threes c20 + d20 + e20, all downloaded
from database 2 are all used as side information in database 1.
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For the privacy: The randomized mapping of message bits and the randomization of the
order of queries guarantees privacy as in [8]. It can be checked that when we fix the queries
for one database, we can adjust the queries for the remaining databases such that the user
can decode any P subset of messages. This is true since all combinations of messages are
generated by our scheme.
To calculate the achievable rate: From Vandermonde’s identity
(
M
i
)
=
∑P
p=0
(
P
p
)(
M−P
i−p
)
,
round i requires downloading
(
P
p
)
stages in round (i−p). These stages should be downloaded
from the remaining (N − 1) databases. Hence, as shown in the previous section, the number
of stages at each round is calculated as the output of an IIR filter whose input-output relation
is given in (56) with the initial conditions y[−P ] = (N−1)M−P , y[−P+1] = · · · = y[−1] = 0,
with the conversion of time index of the filter to the round index of the schemes as αi =
y[(M − P )− i]. These initial conditions imply that the user downloads (N − 1)M−P stages
in the last round that corresponds to downloading the sum of all messages. The (P − 1)
rounds before the last round are suppressed because we only need to form sums of (M − P )
messages to be used in the last round.
Now, to calculate the number of stages for round i, we first solve for the roots of the
characteristic equation of (56) [22],
rP − 1
N − 1
P∑
i=1
(
P
i
)
rP−i = 0 (59)
which is equivalent to
rP − r
P
N − 1
P∑
i=1
(
P
i
)
r−i = 0 (60)
which further reduces to
rP − r
P
N − 1
[(
1 +
1
r
)P
− 1
]
= 0 (61)
using the binomial theorem. Simplifying (61), we have
NrP − (r + 1)P = 0 (62)
By applying the bijective mapping t = N1/P · r
r+1
, (62) is equivalent to tP = 1. The roots
for this equation are the normal roots of unity, i.e., tk = e
j2pi(k−1)/P , k = 1, · · · , P , where
j =
√−1. Hence, the roots of the characteristic equation are given by,
rk =
tk
N1/P − tk =
ej2pi(k−1)/P
N1/P − ej2pi(k−1)/P , k = 1, · · · , P (63)
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Thus, the complete response of the IIR filter is given by y[n] =
∑P
i=1 γir
n
i , where γi are
constants that result from solving the initial conditions, i.e., γ = (γ1, · · · , γP )T is the solution
of the system of equations,


r−P1 r
−P
2 · · · r−PP
r−P+11 r
−P+1
2 · · · r−P+1P
...
... · · · ...
r−11 r
−1
2 · · · r−1P




γ1
γ2
...
γP

 =


(N − 1)M−P
0
...
0

 (64)
Now, we are ready to calculate the number of stages αk in round k. Since αk = y[(M −
P )− k] by construction, then
αk =
P∑
i=1
γir
M−P−k
i (65)
In round k, the user downloads sums of k symbols. The user repeats this round for αk
stages. Each stage contains all the combinations of any k symbols which there are
(
M
k
)
of
them. Hence, the total download cost D is,
D =
M∑
k=1
(
M
k
)
αk (66)
=
M∑
k=1
P∑
i=1
(
M
k
)
γir
M−P−k
i (67)
=
P∑
i=1
γir
M−P
i
M∑
k=1
(
M
k
)
r−ki (68)
=
P∑
i=1
γir
M−P
i
[(
1 +
1
ri
)M
− 1
]
(69)
Considering the undesired equations: in round k, the user downloads all combinations of the
(M−P ) undesired messages which there are (M−P
k
)
of them. Therefore, similar to the above
calculation, the total number of undesired equations U is,
U =
P∑
i=1
γir
M−P
i
[(
1 +
1
ri
)M−P
− 1
]
(70)
Hence, the achievable rate
¯
Rs is
¯
Rs =
D − U
D
(71)
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=∑P
i=1 γir
M−P
i
[(
1 + 1
ri
)M
−
(
1 + 1
ri
)M−P]
∑P
i=1 γir
M−P
i
[(
1 + 1
ri
)M
− 1
] (72)
which is (31) in Theorem 2.
5.5 Further Examples for the Case P ≤ M2
In this section, we illustrate our proposed scheme with a few additional basic examples. In
Section 5.1, we considered the case M = 5, P = 2, N = 2. In the next three sub-sections, we
consider three more examples. In the example in Section 5.5.1, the ratio M
P
is exactly equal
to 2, thus, both the achievable scheme here and the achievable scheme in Section 4 can be
used; we comment about the differences and advantages of both schemes. In the example
in Section 5.5.2, we present the case of a larger N for the example in Section 5.1. In the
example in Section 5.5.3, we present a case with larger M , P and N .
5.5.1 M = 4 Messages, P = 2 Messages, N = 2 Databases
The first step of the achievable scheme is to identify the number of stages needed for each
round of download. The IIR filter in (56) that determines the number of stages reduces in
this case to
y[n] = 2y[n− 1] + y[n− 2] (73)
with the initial conditions y[−2] = 1, y[−1] = 0. The number of stages in round k is
αk = y[2 − k]. Since M is small, we can calculate the output iteratively without using the
canonical filter output as,
α4 = y[−2] = 1 (74)
α3 = y[−1] = 0 (75)
α2 = y[0] = 2y[−1] + y[−2] = 1 (76)
α1 = y[1] = 2y[0] + y[−1] = 2 (77)
Hence, we should download 2 stages of individual symbols (round 1), and 1 stage of sums of
two symbols (round 2). We should suppress the round that retrieves sums of three symbols
(round 3), and have 1 stage of sums of all four symbols (round 4).
The user initializes the scheme by randomly and independently interleaving the symbols
of each message. The query table for this example is shown in Table 5. In round 1, the
user downloads individual symbols from all messages at each database. The user downloads
a1, b1, c1, d1 and a2, b2, c2, d2 from database 1, as α1 = 2. This is repeated for database 2. In
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Table 5: The query table for the case M = 4, P = 2, N = 2.
Database 1 Database 2
rd
.
1 stg 1 a1, b1, c1, d1 a3, b3, c3, d3
stg 2 a2, b2, c2, d2 a4, b4, c4, d4
ro
u
n
d
2
st
ag
e
1
a5 + b3 a1 + b7
a6 + c3 a8 + c1
a7 + d3 a9 + d1
b5 + c4 b8 + c2
b6 + d4 b9 + d2
c5 + d5 c6 + d6
rd
.
4
stg 1 a3 + b10 + c6 + d6 a10 + b1 + c5 + d5
round 2, the user downloads sums of two symbols. There are
(
4
2
)
= 6 such equations. At
database 1, the undesired symbols from database 2 in the first round are exploited in some
of these sums. These equations are either in the form a + (c, d) or in the form b + (c, d).
This necessitates two sets of different individual symbols to be downloaded from database
2 in the first round, or otherwise the symbols are repeated and privacy is compromised.
Moreover, we note that the user downloads a5 + b3 which uses b3 as side information even
though W2 is desired; this is reversed in database 2 to download a1 + b7 with a1 as a side
information to have a symmetric scheme. Round 2 concludes with downloading c5 + d5 and
c6+d6 at the two databases, which will be used as side information in the last round. Round
3 is skipped and the user proceeds to round 4 (last round) directly. In round 4, the user
downloads sum of four symbols, and uses the side information downloaded in round 2 and
any decoded symbols for the other desired message. For example, in database 1, the user
downloads a3+ b10+ c6+ d6, hence, the side information c6+ d6 is exploited in this round as
well as a3. The user finishes the scheme by shuffling the order of all queries randomly. The
user retrieves a1, · · · , a10 and b1, · · · , b10 privately in 30 downloads (15 from each database)
and achieves a sum rate of 20
30
= 2
3
= 1
1+ 1
N
, which matches the upper bound in Theorem 2.
This sum rate outperforms the repetition-based achievable rate which is 3
5
in (12).
We note that this case can be solved using the achievable scheme presented in Section 4
as well since M
P
= 2 in this case. In fact, this is equivalent to the case considered in
Section 4.4.2, if the number of databases is reduced from N = 3 to N = 2. Starting from
Table 3 in Section 4.4.2 and removing the downloads from database 3, we obtain the query
table which uses MDS-coded queries shown in Table 6 below. Via the scheme in Table 6
below, the user retrieves a1, · · · , a4 and b1, · · · , b4 privately in 12 downloads (6 from each
database), therefore achieving the same optimal sum rate of 8
12
= 2
3
= 1
1+ 1
N
.
We presented this case here even though it could be solved using the scheme in Section 4,
in order to give an example where the second achievable scheme achieves the upper bound
in Theorem 2 and yields a capacity result since M
P
is an integer. Interestingly, we observe
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Table 6: Alternative query table for the case M = 4, P = 2, N = 2.
Database 1 Database 2
a1, b1, c1, d1 a2, b2, c2, d2
a3 + b3 + c2 + d2 a4 + b4 + c1 + d1
a3 + 3b3 + 2c2 + 4d2 a4 + 3b4 + 2c1 + 4d1
that for all cases where P = M
2
, the two achievable schemes are both optimal. The two
schemes present an interesting trade-off between the field size and the upload cost: The first
achievable scheme in Section 4 requires using an MDS code with field size q ≥ M but the
number of queries for each database is limited to M + P . On the other hand, the second
achievable scheme here in Section 5 does not use any coding and can work with the storage
field size, however, the number of queries increase exponentially since the number of stages
for each round is related to an unstable IIR filter.
5.5.2 M = 5 Messages, P = 2 Messages, N = 3 Databases
In this example, we show an explicit query structure forN > 2. In this case the corresponding
difference equation for the IIR filter is
y[n] = y[n− 1] + 1
2
y[n− 2] (78)
with the initial conditions y[−1] = 0, y[−2] = (N−1)M−P = 8. Thus, the number of stages in
each round are: α1 = 6, α2 = 4, α3 = 4, α4 = 0, α5 = 8. The query table is shown in Tables 7,
8 and 9. This scheme retrieves a1, · · · , a126 and b1, · · · , b126 privately in 354 downloads (177
from each database), therefore, achieving a sum rate of 252
354
= 42
59
< 1
1+ 1
N
+ 1
2N2
= 18
25
. The gap
is 12
1475
≃ 0.0081.
5.5.3 M = 7 Messages, P = 3 Messages, N = 3 Databases
Finally, in this section, we consider an example with N = 3 databases and larger M and
P than in previous examples, where we describe the structure and the calculation of the
number of queries without specifying the explicit query table as it grows quite large. We
first calculate the number of stages at each round. The corresponding IIR filter is
y[n] =
1
2
(3y[n− 1] + 3y[n− 2] + y[n− 3]) (79)
with the initial conditions y[−3] = (N − 1)M−P = 16, y[−2] = 0, y[−1] = 0. Hence, the
number of stages for each round αk = y[4 − k], k = 1, · · · , 7, are calculated iteratively as
α1 = 67, α2 = 30, α3 = 12, α4 = 8, α5 = 0, α6 = 0, α7 = 16.
In round 1, the user downloads 67 individual symbols from each message and from each
database. Each database can use the side information generated by the other two databases.
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Table 7: The query table for the case M = 5, P = 2, N = 3.
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
ro
u
n
d
1
stg 1 a1, b1, c1, d1, e1 a7, b7, c7, d7, e7 a13, b13, c13, d13, e13
stg 2 a2, b2, c2, d2, e2 a8, b8, c8, d8, e8 a14, b14, c14, d14, e14
stg 3 a3, b3, c3, d3, e3 a9, b9, c9, d9, e9 a15, b15, c15, d15, e15
stg 4 a4, b4, c4, d4, e4 a10, b10, c10, d10, e10 a16, b16, c16, d16, e16
stg 5 a5, b5, c5, d5, e5 a11, b11, c11, d11, e11 a17, b17, c17, d17, e17
stg 6 a6, b6, c6, d6, e6 a12, b12, c12, d12, e12 a18, b18, c18, d18, e18
ro
u
n
d
2
st
ag
e
1
a19 + b7 a33 + b1 a47 + b1
a20 + c7 a34 + c1 a48 + c1
a21 + d7 a35 + d1 a49 + d1
a22 + e7 a36 + e1 a50 + e1
b19 + c8 b33 + c2 b47 + c2
b20 + d8 b34 + d2 b48 + d2
b21 + e8 b35 + e2 b49 + e2
c19 + d19 c27 + d27 c35 + d35
c20 + e19 c28 + e27 c36 + e35
d20 + e20 d28 + e28 d36 + e36
st
ag
e
2
a7 + b22 a1 + b36 a1 + b50
a23 + c9 a37 + c3 a51 + c3
a24 + d9 a38 + d3 a52 + d3
a25 + e9 a39 + e3 a53 + e3
b23 + c10 b37 + c4 b51 + c4
b24 + d10 b38 + d4 b52 + d4
b25 + e10 b39 + e4 b53 + e4
c21 + d21 c29 + d29 c37 + d37
c22 + e21 c30 + e29 c38 + e37
d22 + e22 d30 + e30 d38 + e38
st
ag
e
3
a26 + b13 a40 + b13 a54 + b7
a27 + c13 a41 + c13 a55 + c7
a28 + d13 a42 + d13 a56 + d7
a29 + e13 a43 + e13 a57 + e7
b26 + c14 b40 + c14 b54 + c8
b27 + d14 b41 + d14 b55 + d8
b28 + e14 b42 + e14 b56 + e8
c23 + d23 c31 + d31 c39 + d39
c24 + e23 c32 + e31 c40 + e39
d24 + e24 d32 + e32 d40 + e40
30
Table 8: The query table for the case M = 5, P = 2, N = 3 (cont.).
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
ro
u
n
d
2
st
ag
e
4
a13 + b29 a13 + b43 a7 + b57
a30 + c15 a44 + c15 a58 + c9
a31 + d15 a45 + d15 a59 + d9
a32 + e15 a46 + e15 a60 + e9
b30 + c16 b44 + c16 b58 + c10
b31 + d16 b45 + d16 b59 + d10
b32 + e16 b46 + e16 b60 + e10
c25 + d25 c33 + d33 c41 + d41
c26 + e25 c34 + e33 c42 + e41
d26 + e26 d34 + e34 d42 + e42
ro
u
n
d
3
st
ag
e
1
a61 + b8 + c11 a79 + b2 + c5 a97 + b2 + c5
a8 + b61 + d11 a2 + b79 + d5 a2 + b97 + d5
a62 + b9 + e11 a80 + b3 + e5 a98 + b3 + e5
a63 + c27 + d27 a81 + c19 + d19 a99 + c19 + d19
a64 + c28 + e27 a82 + c20 + e19 a100 + c20 + e19
a65 + d28 + e28 a83 + d20 + e20 a101 + d20 + e20
b62 + c29 + d29 b80 + c21 + d21 b98 + c21 + d21
b63 + c30 + e29 b81 + c22 + e21 b99 + c22 + e21
b64 + d30 + e30 b82 + d22 + e22 b100 + d22 + e22
c43 + d43 + e43 c47 + d47 + e47 c51 + d51 + e51
st
ag
e
2
a9 + b65 + c12 a3 + b83 + c6 a3 + b101 + c6
a66 + b10 + d12 a84 + b4 + d6 a102 + b4 + d6
a10 + b66 + e12 a4 + b84 + e6 a4 + b102 + e6
a67 + c31 + d31 a85 + c23 + d23 a103 + c23 + d23
a68 + c32 + e31 a86 + c24 + e23 a104 + c24 + e23
a69 + d32 + e32 a87 + d24 + e24 a105 + d24 + e24
b67 + c33 + d33 b85 + c25 + d25 b103 + c25 + d25
b68 + c34 + e33 b86 + c26 + e25 b104 + c26 + e25
b69 + d34 + e34 b87 + d26 + e26 b105 + d26 + e26
c44 + d44 + e44 c48 + d48 + e48 c52 + d52 + e52
st
ag
e
3
a70 + b14 + c17 a88 + b14 + c17 a106 + b8 + c11
a14 + b70 + d17 a14 + b88 + d17 a8 + b106 + d11
a71 + b15 + e17 a89 + b15 + e17 a107 + b9 + e11
a72 + c35 + d35 a90 + c35 + d35 a108 + c27 + d27
a73 + c36 + e35 a91 + c36 + e35 a109 + c28 + e27
a74 + d36 + e36 a92 + d36 + e36 a110 + d28 + e28
b71 + c37 + d37 b89 + c37 + d37 b107 + c29 + d29
b72 + c38 + e37 b90 + c38 + e37 b108 + c30 + e29
b73 + d38 + e38 b91 + d38 + e38 b109 + d30 + e30
c45 + d45 + e45 c49 + d49 + e49 c53 + d53 + e53
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Table 9: The query table for the case M = 5, P = 2, N = 3 (cont.).
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
ro
u
n
d
3
st
ag
e
4
a15 + b74 + c18 a15 + b92 + c18 a9 + b110 + c12
a75 + b16 + d18 a93 + b16 + d18 a111 + b10 + d12
a16 + b75 + e18 a16 + b93 + e18 a10 + b111 + e12
a76 + c39 + d39 a94 + c39 + d39 a112 + c31 + d31
a77 + c40 + e39 a95 + c40 + e39 a113 + c32 + e31
a78 + d40 + e40 a96 + d40 + e40 a114 + d32 + e32
b76 + c41 + d41 b94 + c41 + d41 b112 + c33 + d33
b77 + c42 + e41 b95 + c42 + e41 b113 + c34 + e33
b78 + d42 + e42 b96 + d42 + e42 b114 + d34 + e34
c46 + d46 + e46 c50 + d50 + e50 c54 + d54 + e54
ro
u
n
d
5
stg 1 a115 + b11 + c47 + d47 + e47 a119 + b5 + c43 + d43 + e43 a123 + b5 + c43 + d43 + e43
stg 2 a11 + b115 + c48 + d48 + e48 a5 + b119 + c44 + d44 + e44 a5 + b123 + c44 + d44 + e44
stg 3 a116 + b12 + c49 + d49 + e49 a120 + b6 + c45 + d45 + e45 a124 + b6 + c45 + d45 + e45
stg 4 a12 + b116 + c50 + d50 + e50 a6 + b120 + c46 + d46 + e46 a6 + b124 + c46 + d46 + e46
stg 5 a117 + b17 + c51 + d51 + e51 a121 + b17 + c51 + d51 + e51 a125 + b11 + c47 + d47 + e47
stg 6 a17 + b117 + c52 + d52 + e52 a17 + b121 + c52 + d52 + e52 a11 + b125 + c48 + d48 + e48
stg 7 a118 + b18 + c53 + d53 + e53 a122 + b18 + c53 + d53 + e53 a126 + b12 + c49 + d49 + e49
stg 8 a18 + b118 + c54 + d54 + e54 a18 + b122 + c54 + d54 + e54 a12 + b126 + c50 + d50 + e50
Hence, each database has 67·2 = 134 side information equations in the form of single symbols
from round 1 to exploit. In round 2, the user downloads sums of two symbols. Each stage in
round 2 requires 3 stages from round 1, since the user faces with a+(d, e, f, g), b+(d, e, f, g)
or c + (d, e, f, g) cases. Then, round 2 requires 30 · 3 = 90 stages from the generated side
information in round 1, and we are left with 134 − 90 = 44 more stages of round 1. Each
database can use the side information stages from the other two databases, i.e., each can use
up to 2 · 30 = 60 stages of side information in the form of sums of two.
In round 3, the user downloads sums of three symbols, which can be either of a + b +
(d, e, f, g), a+ c+ (d, e, f, g), b+ c+ (d, e, f, g), a+ (d+ e, d+ f, · · · ), and similarly for b, c.
Therefore, each stage in round 3 requires 3 stages from round 2, and 3 stages from round
1. This in total requires 12 · 3 = 36 stages from round 1 and 36 stages from round 2, and
we will be left with 8 stages from round 1 and 24 stages from round 2. Round 3 generates
2 · 12 = 24 stages of side information in the form of sums of threes. In round 4, the user
downloads sums of 4 symbols, which can be either a+ b+(d+ e, d+f, · · · ), and similarly for
b+ c and a+ c, a+ (d+ e+ f, d+ e+ g, · · · ) and similarly for b, c, or a+ b+ c+ (d, e, f, g).
This means that for each stage of round 3, the user needs 1 stage of round 1, 3 stages of
round 2, and 3 stages of round 3. This in total requires 8 · 3 = 24 stages from round 2 and
3 and 8 · 1 stages from round 1 and hence, we exhaust all the generated side information by
round 4. Round 4 generates 8 stages of side information in the form of sums of fours. This
will be used in the last round to get 8 · 2 new symbols from the desired messages.
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The achievable sum rate in this case is 3933
5445
= 437
605
< 1
1+ 1
N
+ 1
3N2
= 27
37
. The gap is 166
22385
≃
0.0074.
6 Converse Proof
In this section, we derive an upper bound for the MPIR problem. The derived upper bound
is tight when P ≥ M
2
and when M
P
∈ N. We follow the notations and simplifications in [8,12],
and we define
Q , {Q[P]n : P ⊆ {1, · · · ,M}, |P| = P, n ∈ {1, · · · , N}} (80)
A[P]n1:n2 ,
{
A[P]n1 , A
[P]
n1+1, · · · , A[P]n2
}
, n1 ≤ n2, n1, n2 ∈ {1, · · · , N} (81)
Without loss of generality, the following simplifications hold for the MPIR problem:
1. We can assume that the MPIR scheme is symmetric. Since for every asymmetric
scheme, there exists an equal rate symmetric scheme that can be constructed by repli-
cating all permutations of databases and messages.
2. To invoke the privacy constraint, we fix the response of one database to be the same
irrespective of the desired set of messages P, i.e., A[Pi]n = An, where |Pi| = P for every
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , β} for some n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, and β = (M
P
)
. No loss of generality is
incurred due to the fact that the queries and the answers are statistically independent
from P. In the sequel, we fix the answer string of the first database, i.e.,
A
[P]
1 = A1, ∀P (82)
The following lemma is a consequence of the symmetry assumption; its proof can be
found in [8].
Lemma 1 (Symmetry [8]) For any WS = {Wi : i ∈ S}
H(A[P]n |WS ,Q) = H(A[P]1 |WS ,Q), n ∈ {1, · · · , N} (83)
H(A1|Q) = H(A[P]n |Q), n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, ∀P (84)
We construct the converse proof by induction over ⌊M
P
⌋ in a similar way to [8, 12]. The
base induction step is obtained for 1 ≤ M
P
≤ 2 (this is the case P ≥ M
2
as it was referred to so
far, where the user wants to retrieve at least half of the messages). We obtain an inductive
relation for the case M
P
> 2. The converse proof extends the proof in [8] for P > 1.
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6.1 Converse Proof for the Case 1 ≤ M
P
≤ 2
To prove the converse for the case 1 ≤ M
P
≤ 2, we need the following lemma which gives a
lower bound on the interference within an answer string.
Lemma 2 (Interference Lower Bound) For the MPIR problem with P ≥ M
2
, the uncer-
tainty of the interfering messages WP+1:M within the answer string A
[1:P ]
1 is lower bounded
as,
H(A
[1:P ]
1 |W1:P ,Q) ≥
(M − P )L
N
(85)
Furthermore, (85) is true for any set of desired messages P with |P| = P , i.e.,
H(A
[P]
1 |WP ,Q) ≥
(M − P )L
N
(86)
Proof: For clarity of presentation, we assume that P = {1, · · · , P} without loss of generality.
Hence,
(M − P )L = H(WP+1:M) (87)
= H(WP+1:M |W1:P ,Q) (88)
= H(WP+1:M |W1:P ,Q)−H(WP+1:M |A[M−P+1:M ]1:N ,W1:P ,Q) (89)
= I(WP+1:M ;A
[M−P+1:M ]
1:N |W1:P ,Q) (90)
= H(A
[M−P+1:M ]
1:N |W1:P ,Q) (91)
≤
N∑
n=1
H(A[M−P+1:M ]n |W1:P ,Q) (92)
= NH(A1|W1:P ,Q) (93)
where (88) follows from the independence of the messages WP+1:M from the messages W1:P
and the queries as in (2) and (3); (89) follows from the reliability constraint (7), since
messages WP+1:M can be decoded correctly from the answer strings A
[M−P+1:M ]
1:N if P ≥ M2 as
{P + 1, · · · ,M} ⊆ {M − P + 1, · · · ,M} in this regime; (91) follows from the fact that the
answer strings are deterministic functions of all messages and queries (Q,W1:M); and (93)
follows from the independence bound and Lemma 1.
Consequently, H(A1|W1:P ,Q) ≥ (M−P )LN . The proof of the general statement can be done
replacing W1:P byWP , WP+1:M byWP¯ which corresponds to the complement set of messages
of WP , and the answer strings A
[M−P+1:M ]
1:N by A
[P∗]
1:N , where P¯ ⊆ P∗, |P∗| = P . 
Now, we are ready to prove the converse of the case P ≥ M
2
. We use a similar converse
technique to the case of M = 2, P = 1 in [8],
ML = H(W1:M) (94)
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= H(W1:M |Q) (95)
= H(W1:M |Q)−H(W1:M |A[P1]1:N , A[P2]1:N , · · · , A[Pβ ]1:N ,Q) (96)
= I(W1:M ;A
[P1]
1:N , A
[P2]
1:N , · · · , A[Pβ ]1:N |Q) (97)
= H(A
[P1]
1:N , A
[P2]
1:N , · · · , A[Pβ ]1:N |Q) (98)
= H(A1, A
[P1]
2:N , A
[P2]
2:N , · · · , A[Pβ ]2:N |Q) (99)
= H(A1, A
[P1]
2:N |Q) +H(A[P2]2:N , · · · , A[Pβ ]2:N |A1, A[P1]2:N ,Q) (100)
= H(A1, A
[P1]
2:N |Q) +H(A[P2]2:N , · · · , A[Pβ ]2:N |A1, A[P1]2:N ,WP ,Q) (101)
≤
N∑
n=1
H(A[P]n |Q) +H(A[P2]2:N , · · · , A[Pβ ]2:N |A1,WP ,Q) (102)
=
N∑
n=1
H(A[P]n |Q) +H(A[P2]1:N , · · · , A[Pβ ]1:N |WP ,Q)−H(A1|WP ,Q) (103)
where (95) follows from the independence between the messages and the queries; (96) follows
from the reliability constraint in (7) with A
[P1]
1:N , A
[P2]
1:N , · · · , A[Pβ ]1:N representing all answer strings
from all databases to any subset of messages P ⊆ {1, · · · ,M}; (98) follows from the fact that
answer strings are deterministic functions of the messages and the queries; (99) follows from
simplification (82) without loss of generality; (101) follows from the fact that the messages
WP = (Wi1 ,Wi2, · · · ,WiP ) can be reconstructed from A[P]1:N ; and (102) is a consequence of
the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy and Lemma 1.
Now, every message appears in
(
M−1
P−1
)
different message subsets of size P , therefore the
answer strings (A
[P2]
1:N , · · · , A[Pβ ]1:N ) are sufficient to construct all messages W1:M irrespective of
P1. Therefore,
H(A
[P2]
1:N , · · · , A[Pβ ]1:N |WP ,Q) = (M − P )L (104)
Using this and Lemma 2 in (103) yields
ML ≤
N∑
n=1
H(A[P]n |Q) + (M − P )L−
(M − P )L
N
(105)
which can be written as,
PL+
(M − P )L
N
≤
N∑
n=1
H(A[P]n |Q) (106)
which further can be written as,
(
1 +
M − P
PN
)
PL ≤
N∑
n=1
H(A[P]n |Q) (107)
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which leads to the desired converse result,
P∑
i=1
Ri =
PL∑N
n=1H
(
A
[P]
n
) ≤ PL∑N
n=1H
(
A
[P]
n |Q
) ≤ 1
1 + M−P
PN
(108)
6.2 Converse Proof for the Case M
P
> 2
In the sequel, we derive an inductive relation that can be used in addition to the base
induction step of 1 ≤ M
P
≤ 2 derived in the previous sub-section to obtain an upper bound
for the MPIR problem. The idea we pursue here is similar in spirit to the one in [8], where
the authors developed a base converse step forM = 2 messages, and developed an induction
over the number of messagesM for the caseM > 2. Here, we have developed a base converse
step for 1 ≤ M
P
≤ 2, and now develop an induction over ⌊M
P
⌋
for the case M
P
> 2.
The following lemma upper bounds the remaining uncertainty of the answer strings after
knowing a subset of size P of the interference messages.
Lemma 3 (Interference Conditioning Lemma) The remaining uncertainty in the an-
swer strings A
[P2]
2:N after conditioning on the messages indexed by P1, such that P1 ∩ P2 = φ,
|P1| = |P2| = P is upper bounded by,
H(A
[P2]
2:N |WP1 ,Q) ≤ (N − 1)[NH(A1|Q)− PL] (109)
Proof: We begin with
H(A
[P2]
2:N |WP1 ,Q)
≤
N∑
n=2
H(A[P2]n |WP1 ,Q) (110)
≤
N∑
n=2
H(A
[P1]
1:n−1, A
[P2]
n , A
[P1]
n+1:N |WP1 ,Q) (111)
=
N∑
n=2
H(A
[P1]
1:n−1, A
[P2]
n , A
[P1]
n+1:N ,WP1|Q)−H(WP1 |Q) (112)
=
N∑
n=2
H(A
[P1]
1:n−1, A
[P2]
n , A
[P1]
n+1:N |Q) +H(WP1|A[P1]1:n−1, A[P2]n , A[P1]n+1:N)−H(WP1) (113)
≤
N∑
n=2
NH(A1|Q)−H(WP1) (114)
= (N − 1)[NH(A1|Q)− PL] (115)
where (110) follows from the independence bound; (111) follows from the non-negativity
of entropy; (113) follows from the statistical independence between the messages and the
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queries; and (114) follows from the decodability ofWP1 given the answer strings (A
[P1]
1:n−1, A
[P2]
n ,
A
[P1]
n+1:N), which is tantamount to the privacy constraint as in the second simplification. 
Now, we derive the inductive relation for M
P
> 2. Without loss of generality, let P1 =
{1, · · · , P} and P2 = {P + 1, · · · , 2P}. Then, starting from (99), we write
ML =H(A1, A
[P1]
2:N , A
[P2]
2:N , · · · , A[Pβ ]2:N |Q) (116)
=H(A1, A
[P1]
2:N |Q) +H(A[P2]2:N |A1, A[P1]2:N ,Q) +H(A[P3]2:N , · · · , A[Pβ ]2:N |A1, A[P1]2:N , A[P2]2:N ,Q)
(117)
≤NH(A1|Q) +H(A[P2]2:N |A1, A[P1]2:N ,W1:P ,Q)
+H(A
[P3]
2:N , · · · , A[Pβ ]2:N |A1, A[P1]2:N , A[P2]2:N ,W1:2P ,Q) (118)
≤NH(A1|Q) +H(A[P2]2:N |W1:P ,Q) +H(A[P3]2:N ,· · ·, A[Pβ ]2:N |A1,W1:2P ,Q) (119)
=NH(A1|Q) +H(A[P2]2:N |W1:P ,Q)+H(A[P3]1:N ,· · ·, A[Pβ ]1:N |W1:2P ,Q)−H(A1|W1:2P ,Q)
(120)
=NH(A1|Q) +H(A[P2]2:N |W1:P ,Q) + (M − 2P )L−H(A1|W1:2P ,Q) (121)
≤NH(A1|Q) + (N − 1)[NH(A1|Q)− PL] + (M − 2P )L−H(A1|W1:2P ,Q) (122)
where (118) follows from the decodability of W1:2P given (A1, A
[P1]
2:N , A
[P2]
2:N ), the symmetry
lemma and the independence bound; (119) follows from the fact that conditioning does
not increase entropy. In (121), we note that subsets (P3, · · · ,Pβ) include all messages
(W1, · · · ,WM) because every message appears in
(
M−1
P−1
)
subsets. Hence, H(A
[P3]
1:N , · · · , A[Pβ ]1:N |
W1:2P ,Q) = (M − 2P )L since W2P+1:M is decodable from (A[P3]1:N , · · · , A[Pβ ]1:N ) after knowing
W1:2P . Finally, (122) follows from the interference conditioning lemma.
Consequently, (122) can be written as
N2H(A1|Q) ≥ (N + 1)PL+H(A1|W1:2P ,Q) (123)
which is equivalent to
NH(A1|Q) ≥
(
1 +
1
N
)
PL+
1
N
H(A1|W1:2P ,Q) (124)
Now, (124) constructs an inductive relation, since evaluating NH(A1|W1:2P ,Q) is the same
as NH(A1|Q) with (M − 2P ) messages, i.e., the problem of MPIR with M messages for
fixed P is reduced to an MPIR problem with (M − 2P ) messages for the same fixed P . We
note that (124) generalizes the inductive relation in [8] for P = 1.
We can write the induction hypothesis for MPIR with M messages as
NH(A1|Q) ≥ PL

⌊MP ⌋−1∑
i=0
1
N i
+
(
M
P
−
⌊
M
P
⌋)
1
N⌊MP ⌋

 (125)
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Next, we proceed with proving this relation for M + 1 messages. From the induction
hypothesis, we have
NH(A1|W1:2P ,Q) ≥ PL

⌊M−2P+1P ⌋−1∑
i=0
1
N i
+
(
M − 2P + 1
P
−
⌊
M − 2P + 1
P
⌋)
1
N⌊M−2P+1P ⌋


(126)
= PL

⌊M+1P ⌋−3∑
i=0
1
N i
+
(
M + 1
P
−
⌊
M + 1
P
⌋)
1
N⌊M+1P ⌋−2

 (127)
substituting this in (124),
NH(A1|Q) ≥
(
1 +
1
N
)
PL+
PL
N2

⌊M+1P ⌋−3∑
i=0
1
N i
+
(
M + 1
P
−
⌊
M + 1
P
⌋)
1
N⌊M+1P ⌋−2


(128)
= PL

⌊M+1P ⌋−1∑
i=0
1
N i
+
(
M + 1
P
−
⌊
M + 1
P
⌋)
1
N⌊M+1P ⌋

 (129)
which concludes the induction argument.
Consequently, the upper bound for the MPIR problem can be obtained as,
P∑
i=1
Ri =
PL∑N
n=1H
(
A
[P]
n
) (130)
≤ PL
NH(A1|Q) (131)
=
1∑⌊M
P
⌋−1
i=0
1
N i
+
(
M
P
− ⌊M
P
⌋)
1
N⌊MP ⌋
(132)
=
(
1− ( 1
N
)⌊
M
P
⌋
1− 1
N
+
(
M
P
−
⌊
M
P
⌋)
1
N⌊MP ⌋
)−1
(133)
where (132) follows from (129); and (133) follows from evaluating the sum in (132).
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced the multi-message private information retrieval (MPIR) prob-
lem from an information-theoretic perspective. The problem generalizes the PIR problem
in [8] which retrieves a single message privately. We determined the exact sum capacity for
this problem when the number of desired messages is at least half of the number of total
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stored messages to be CPs =
1
1+M−P
PN
. We showed that joint retrieval of the desired messages
strictly outperforms repeating the single-message capacity achieving scheme for each mes-
sage. Furthermore, we showed that if the total number of messages is an integer multiple of
the number of desired messages, then the sum capacity is CPs =
1− 1
N
1−( 1
N
)M/P
, which resembles
the single-message PIR capacity expression when the number of messages is M
P
. For the
remaining cases, we derived lower and upper bounds. We observed numerically that the
gap between the lower and bounds decreases monotonically in N , and the worst case gap is
0.0082 which occurs for the case N = 2 when M = 5, P = 2.
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